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Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has shown that in environments characterised by a
social-dilemma situation punishment may be an adaptive behaviour. Exper-
imental evidence closely corresponds to this ﬁnding but yields contradictory
results on the cooperation-enhancing eﬀect of punishment if players are allowed
to retaliate against their punishers. The present study sets out to examine the
question of whether cooperation will still be part of an evolutionary stable strat-
egy if we allow for counterpunishment opportunities in a theoretic model and
tries to reconcile the seemingly contradictory ﬁndings from the laboratory. We
ﬁnd that the apparent contradictions can be explained by a diﬀerence in the
number of retaliation stages employed (one vs many) and even small diﬀerences
in the degree of retaliativeness.
Key words: Public goods, Strong reciprocity, Conformism,
Counter-punishment, Evolution of behavior
JEL: H41, C90
1. Introduction
Recent laboratory experiments have cast serious doubt on the external va-
lidity of earlier ﬁndings suggesting that punishment is a suitable solution for
social-dilemma situations. Not only may there be some scepticism regarding
the welfare eﬀects of punishment, as the discussion coming to a head in Dreber
et al. (2008) and ﬁnding its preliminary end in the study of Gächter et al. (2008)
shows, but the very cooperation-enhancing eﬀect seems to be challenged: by re-
laxing the restriction to one round of punishment and allowing for retaliation,
Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) demonstrate how sensitive
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the cooperative outcome of earlier studies are to changes in the experimental
setup. While the exogenous restriction to a single stage of punishment does
not seem to be plausible in most real-world situations, existing (evolutionary)
models of cooperation have comfortably rested on this assumption. The present
paper makes a ﬁrst step in addressing the challenge posed by the experimental
results mentioned, incorporating the issue of counterpunishment in an evolution-
ary model of cooperation. More speciﬁcally, we set out to provide an answer to
the question of whether strong reciprocity  with its disposition to punish non-
cooperators  may still be part of the outcome of an evolutionary process when
some (defecting) players engage in retaliative action. At the same time, our
model illustrates a plausible explanation for the `resurrection' of cooperation in
subsequent studies of punishment and counterpunishment, such as Nikiforakis
and Engelmann (2008) or Nicklisch and Wolﬀ (2009). We show that both the
number of retaliation stages and the degree of players' retaliativeness may play
a critical role in determining the outcome. The task of explaining the emergence
of retaliation, however, is left to future studies.
Evolutionary models of cooperation and strong reciprocity. Cooperation is a cen-
tral aspect of human societies which researchers from many diﬀerent ﬁelds are
still paying attention to (e.g. Hauert et al., 2007, de Quervain et al., 2004,
Henrich et al., 2006, or Herrmann et al., 2008). One avenue of research fol-
lowed by scholars from ﬁelds as diverse as anthropology, biology, and economics
is the study of evolutionary models to obtain a better understanding of how
the large amount of cooperation observed in today's societies (observable e.g.
in the preparation of a coordinated political response to the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008) may have developed. A lot of work amongst students of the evolution of
cooperation has been devoted to aspects such as kinship (Hamilton, 1964), re-
ciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), costly signaling
(Zahavi, 1975, Gintis et al., 2001), indirect reciprocity and reputation (Alexan-
der, 1979 and 1987, Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), `culture' (Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981, Boyd and Richerson, 1985), norms (Sugden, 1986, Sethi, 1996),
group selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998), and strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000,
Gintis et al., 2003).1
This last concept of strong reciprocity has received a lot of attention, as it is
unique among the mentioned theoretical solution in that it would predict coop-
erative behaviour in the artefactual world of an anonymous laboratory setting
without repeated interaction between the same players.2 In light of the fact that
we observe a substantial degree of cooperation in these situations, the concept of
1The studies mentioned are only meant to indicate important early contributions. For
more detailed picture of the literature, the interested reader is kindly referred e.g. to the
works collected in Hammerstein (2003).
2I am indebted to Nikos Nikiforakis for the comment that other social norms may also
account for this ﬁnding. While this is true, these other norms would typically require a suﬃ-
ciently accurate pre-play recognition of the other player's type to survive in an evolutionary
context (cf. Sethi, 1996). In the laboratory, however, this would seem to be a rather strong
assumption.
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strong reciprocity seems to be worth a closer look. The ﬁrst thing to note is that
the concept may have diﬀerent readings, as the discussion triggered by Fehr and
Henrich (2003) shows (cf. Stephens, 2005 or McKenzie Alexander, 2005). The
general idea, however, is that of a behavioral disposition to sacriﬁce resources
to bestow beneﬁts on those who have bestowed beneﬁts and to sacriﬁce re-
sources to punish those who are not bestowing beneﬁts in accordance with some
social norm.3 In a prisoner's dilemma or a public-good game like the ones used
in the aforementioned models on the evolution of cooperation, this translates
into a cooperative action in settings without repeated interaction as well as with
repeated interation, unless  in the latter case  if the other player(s) is (are) in
bad standing. On the other hand, strong reciprocity stipulates the punishment
of defectors whenever there are punishment stages and regardless of players'
anonymity.
While it has been shown that unconditional cooperation cannot easily be
stabilised in such settings, costly punishment can be evolutionary stable and
thus support cooperation in societies even when there is no inter-group conﬂict
(Henrich and Boyd, 2001, Bowles and Gintis, 2004, Carpenter et al., 2004, Car-
penter, 2007). The intuition for this ﬁnding is rather straightforward: the payoﬀ
diﬀerence between an unconditional cooperator and a free-rider in the absence
of punishers will always be positive, no matter what the type distribution in
the society is. On the other hand, the payoﬀ diﬀerence between a free-rider and
a punisher may be negative if the fraction of punishers is large enough. Once
free-riders are driven out of society, the payoﬀ diﬀerence between punishers and
pure cooperators goes to zero, such that punishers can survive and act as so-
ciety's insurance against an invasion by free-riders. Recent contributions have
gone on to show that punishing cooperators can even invade a non-cooperative
society under certain conditions (Fowler, 2005, Hauert et al., 2007). This may
happen if the public good is not an ideal-type public good, in the sense that
people may opt out of the provision-and-beneﬁt process completely, and doing
so, earn a higher payoﬀ than those participating in the public good under om-
nilateral defection. In that case, non-participants can take over a society of
free-riders, being succeeded by either punishers or pure cooperators. Punishers
will eventually be taken over by pure cooperators by neutral drift, who will
subsequently be invaded by free-riders. Then, the cycle starts all over again.
However, over time, society will spend most of the time in a cooperative state,
given the transition between pure cooperators and punishers will often take a
long time.
Experimental studies. Social dilemmas like those employed by the above studies
are characterised by the fact that each player has a dominant strategy of devi-
ating from the socially optimal choice in favour of the player's individual gain,
and, if a punishment stage exists, of not spending any resources on punishment.
3Fehr and Henrich (2003, p.57); for a discussion of the diﬀerent readings of strong reci-
procity depending on whether this is seen as a behaviour (or behavioural algorithm) or a
strategy, cf. Stephens (2005).
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While the standard game-theoretic solution of the dilemma is obvious, it is a
priori far from clear whether this prediction corresponds to empirical observa-
tions or not, given real players' behaviour may be driven by other motivations
apart from their individual material gain  such as strong reciprocity. One
important source of empirical evidence to address this question is the experi-
mental economics literature, as in comparison to the ﬁeld, controlled laboratory
experiments are not as prone to diﬀerent interpretations of observed behaviour.
Therefore, experiments suggest themselves as a suitable backdrop against which
results from the evolutionary literature can be examined.4
As in evolutionary models, in public-good experiments without features that
go beyond the simultaneous decision problem of how much to contribute to the
public good (translating into `all' or `nothing' in the prisoner's-dilemma case)
and without information on the other players, cooperation cannot be sustained
over long rounds.5 In contrast, Yamagishi (1986) and Fehr and Gächter (2000,
2002) were able to show that punishment was very eﬀective in inducing coop-
eration in public-good games.6 This result has been replicated e.g. by Niki-
forakis (2008) and Denant-Boemont et al. (2007; henceforth, dnm). However,
both latter studies go on to show that this ﬁnding is valid only when pun-
ishment is restricted to a single punishment stage following the contribution
stage. If (only) punished players can hit back, counterpunishment seems to
eliminate the contribution-enhancing eﬀect of single-stage punishment. dnm go
on to show that for a second punishment stage without restrictions on punish-
ment behaviour, cooperation is still reduced when compared to the single-stage
punishment case, albeit not as much as in the counterpunishment-only situa-
tion. Adding further punishment stages leads to contradicting results: while in
the study by Denant-Boemont et al., the level of cooperation is as low as in
the treatment with two punishment stages, Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008,
henceforth ne) observe a cooperation level that is as high as in the traditional
single-punishment-stage design. Nicklisch and Wolﬀ (2009, nw), focusing on
a diﬀerent question, only run a multiple-stage-punishment treatment, ﬁnding
stable, non-decreasing average contributions at around half the endowment.
Previous studies and our model. Three important diﬀerences in the experimen-
tal setup come to mind that may account for the diﬀerent ﬁndings:
(i) the studies employed diﬀerent punishment technologies: dnm and nw use
the technology employed in Fehr and Gächter (2000), while ne make use of
a linear 1 : 2 punishment technology similar to the linear 1 : 3 technology
in Fehr and Gächter (2002),7
4This approach is not new: for other examples, cf. e.g. the studies by Gintis et al. (2003),
Carpenter et al. (2004), or Carpenter (2007).
5Cf. the extensive survey in Ledyard (1995), or the summary of the core facts in Os-
trom (2000, p. 140).
6Cf. Ostrom et al. (1992) for a similar result in a commons dilemma.
7As Nikos Nikiforakis pointed out to me, it remains an unresolved question whether an
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(ii) the end of each stage game is determined in diﬀerent ways: there is an
exogenously-ﬁxed number of 5 punishment stages in the case of dnm, and
an endogenous number of stages in ne and nw;8 and
(iii) the subject pools are diﬀerent: dnm conducted their experiment in Rennes
(France), ne in London (UK), and nw in Bonn (Germany).
In this paper, we will focus on explanation (iii), even though we cannot rule out
any of the above diﬀerences as a possible explanation for the diverging ﬁndings.
However, (iii) seems especially interesting in light of the results of Herrmann
et al. (2008), who ﬁnd that the inclination to punish anti- as well as pro-social
actions can diﬀer considerably across societies. From our model, we will ﬁnd
that such population diﬀerences need not be large for substantial changes in the
likelihood of a cooperative outcome.
On a more general level, another important question arises in light of the
contradictory laboratory ﬁndings: can the high degree of cooperation among
humans still be explained by the possibility to punish defecting society mem-
bers, as the results of Nikiforakis and Engelmann suggest, or is this a rather
unlikely explanation, as the earlier ﬁndings of Denant-Boemont et al. seem to
show? Bearing in mind that the standard approach in the literature on the
evolution of cooperation holds that while free riders occasionally punish coop-
erators, they do so rarely enough that we [can] restrict the ability to punishment
to cooperators,9 the answer to this question is far from clear. If at all, models
of cooperation have included additional punishment stages reserved to sanction
enforcement (Henrich and Boyd, 2001). However, the experimental counterpun-
ishment studies show that retaliation is a force to factor in, whereas evidence
for second-order punishment is rather weak (e.g., Nicklisch and Wolﬀ, 2009).
Hence, the question to be answered is whether we can really abstract from re-
taliation when explaining cooperation by punishment. More speciﬁcally, would
strong reciprocity with its disposition to punish non-cooperators still be part of
an evolutionary stable outcome when some (defecting) players engage in coun-
terpunishment?
Henrich and Henrich (2006) identify the main reasons for the stabilisation of
cooperation through punishment to work in the classical evolutionary models:
(I) punishers don't have to pay the costs of punishing very often if being
punished is more costly than the costs associated with sticking to the
norm  (...) punishers need only punish occasional deviants;
(II) the cost of punishing is small (and probably ambiguous), so conformist
increase in the punishment-eﬃciency parameter from 1 : 2 to 1 : 3 would lead to an increasing
trend in average contributions for multiple punishment stages as it does in the case without
counterpunishment, cf. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008). While such a shift could make
enforcement more eﬀective, it would also render backlashing defectors a more dire threat.
8An important consequence of this diﬀerence is that, in dnm, punishment could be delayed
strategically until the ﬁnal punishment stage to forego retaliation.
9Carpenter et al. (2004, p. 409), addition by this author.
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transmission can overcome it, and keep a strategy of punishing stable in
the social group;10 and
(III) when punishing norm violators is common, everyone tends to adhere to the
norm because the costs of being punished for violating the norm exceed
the costs of sticking with the norm.
While introducing retaliation opportunities will leave (I) and (III) unaﬀected,
the cost of punishing will increase when some of the punished strike back.11
Hence, one would conjecture the disadvantage to be overcome by conformist
transmission or intergroup conﬂict will increase. Indeed, we ﬁnd the retaliation
frequency determines the set of initial type-distributions attaining the cooper-
ative outcome. However, we show that the introduction of retaliation possibili-
ties may act in either direction: for high frequencies of counterpunishment, the
basin of attraction of the punishment ﬁxed point decreases as expected, while
it is expanded for low such frequencies. This is due to the attenuation of actual
payoﬀ diﬀerences by an aggravation of the worst-case scenario, against which
any payoﬀ diﬀerences are evaluated.
For the purpose of our paper, we shortly introduce a baseline model without
counterpunishment opportunities as our benchmark in section 2 and discuss
its main properties before we proceed to introduce retaliation in section 3. In
this section, we will contrast the results of our model for low respectively high
counterpunishment frequencies to the benchmark case and subsequently address
the question of whether a cooperative society and positive retaliativeness levels
are mutually exclusive. In section 4, we discuss our ﬁndings relating them to
the experimental ﬁndings that provided an essential part of the motivation for
undertaking the present study, as well as to the results of existing evolutionary
models of cooperation. We conclude in section 5.
2. The baseline model
In our basic assumptions, we will closely follow the model presented by
Henrich and Boyd (2001) and modiﬁed in Boyd et al. (2003). Assume the life
of an individual predominantly consists of decisions on cooperative behaviour
and there are no external gains from signalling (for example through ancillary
games, as in Gintis et al., 2001). While we are well-aware of the importance of
partner choice possibilities (Hruschka and Henrich, 2006) as well as reputation
(for a review, cf. Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), we abstract from both for the
purpose of this paper, given both aspects are ruled out in the experimental
settings we contrast our ﬁndings against.
At each moment in time, groups consisting of N individuals are randomly
drawn from a very large population. Interaction takes place in the form of a one-
10They further point out that a conformist bias is not necessary when there is intergroup
conﬂict as Boyd et al. (2003) have shown.
11For empirical support of this argument, cf. Nikiforakis (2008) or Nikiforakis and Engel-
mann (2008).
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shot game consisting of two stages. In stage 0, the contribution stage, agents
play a symmetric N -person binary public-good game. A cooperating player
incurs a cost of c to convey a beneﬁt of b/N to every member of the group,
where b/N < c < b, while a defecting player does not incur any cost nor convey
any beneﬁt. In the second stage, players may punish each other, incurring a
cost of k/N and inducing a damage of p/N for the player punished. We as-
sume there are three types of agents: (i) defectors who do not contribute to the
public good, (ii) cooperators who contribute c unless they make a mistake with
an error probability e, and (iii) punishers (strong reciprocators) who behave as
cooperators in stage 0 and punish non-contributors unless they make a mistake
with the same error probability e. This assymmetric treatment regarding the
proneness to errors was introduced by Henrich and Boyd (2001), the intuition
being that players do not erroneously exert an eﬀort (given they have already
chosen not to) but may well fail to do so, be it for external reasons or forget-
fulness. While from our point of view it is plausible to assume defectors do
not cooperate by chance, non-punishers could well be expected to erroneously
punish with a certain probability  think of an untargeted, casual remark that is
perceived as a chastisement for a non-cooperative behaviour the speaker might
not even have been aware of. We abstract from this for simplicity, and for better
comparability with Henrich and Boyd's results. We also abstract from errors of
perception, for the same reasons.
Denoting the fraction of defectors, cooperators and punishers by piD, piC ,
and piP , respectively, and omitting the beneﬁt-term for ease of exposition, we
have the following expected payoﬀs Bi:
12
BD = −(1− e)piP p,
BC = −(1− e)c− e(1− e)piP p = −(1− e)c+ eBD
BP = −(1− e)c− e(1− e)piP p− (1− e)[1− (piP + piC)(1− e)]k.
= BC − (1− e)[1− (piP + piC)(1− e)]k
(1)
Having established the basic game, we now proceed to derive the replicator
dynamics for this case.
2.1. Replicator dynamics of the baseline game
To derive the dynamics, we assume that after playing the game, agents
reproduce asexually and die. Their oﬀspring ﬁrst takes on the parent's type,
but additionally gets to know a random type's average payoﬀ and frequency of
occurrence from the recent round. Alternatively, we may interpret the situation
as agents running into another agent every certain time period and reconsidering
their type. With probabilites α and (1 − α) an agent chooses a learning rule,
comparing either the frequency of the other agent's type, pij , to their own, pii, or
12We can omit the public-good beneﬁt in the payoﬀ equations without loss of generality
because this term is the same for all players and for a type's ﬁtness (or attractiveness, in our
interpretation of the model), only payoﬀ diﬀerences are relevant.
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expected payoﬀs Bj versus Bi. Then, we take the probability of a type-switch
to be equal to
prob(j|i, j) = 1
2
[
1 + (1− α)β(Bj −Bi) + α(pij − pii)
]
, (2)
where β is the inverted largest-possible payoﬀ diﬀerence between player types
and thus normalises payoﬀ diﬀerences to lie within the intervall [−1; 1], while
prob(j|i, j) is the probability that an agent of type i turns into a j-type given
they meet.13
While it is not our purpose to enter into an extensive discussion on whether a
conformist learning rule like the one our agents perform in α∗100 percent of the
cases is a suitable description of human behavior, a few words seem warranted.14
The question comes into mind of why an agent capable of calculating expected
payoﬀs as well as accumulating enough information to have a perfect knowledge
of the society's type distribution would follow a rule that is as simple as `do
what the others do'. There are four possible answers: (i) the agent may have
a preference for not standing out, for not appearing deviant,15 or even derive
utility from simply making the same choice as one's reference group;16 (ii)
while the agent may be capable of accumulating the necessary information, she
may face information costs that may make it a good choice to avoid gathering
the information and to rely on others' example;17 (iii) if we assume the agents
do not always obtain all the information needed to calculate expected payoﬀs, or
are not capable of doing so generally receiving information on the payoﬀs from
some sort of agency, (1 − α) can be interpreted as the probability with which
the agent has this information. In case the agent does not, it seems plausible
to use frequencies (which may be easier to obtain) as the best information
available on a strategy's ﬁtness; ﬁnally, (iv) Andrés Guzmán et al. (2007) show
that a conformist learning rule may not only enhance cooperation but increase
the ﬁtness of groups and thus be adaptive in environments characterised by
cooperative dilemmas and (however rare) intergroup conﬂict.18 As our focus
does not lie on the question of which learning-rules are going to be employed
13Equation (2) assumes that, if neither payoﬀs nor frequencies diﬀer between the types, the
individual will acquire either type with probability 0.5. In other words, there is no status-quo
bias towards his inherited (or past) type. We admit that this will be a strong assumption
in many contexts; we nevertheless follow Henrich and Boyd (2001) in this respect, as it ren-
ders the model easier to handle and more traceable. We conjecture that a deviation from
this assumption would not change the qualitative results but merely slow down the model
dynamics.
14For a more thorough discussion of this issue, cf. e.g. Henrich and Henrich (2006).
15Ibd.; also, cf. Zafar (2009).
16Zafar (2009, p. 1); in an public-good experiment with public-account payoﬀs going to a
well-known charity, he ﬁnds that conformism plays an important role in subject behaviour.
17Cf. e.g. Henrich and McElreath (2003), or Richerson and Boyd (2005).
18Note that in their case agents do not mix learning rules  they are either payoﬀ-oriented or
conformist learners. In our case, this would lead to six diﬀerent types in the basic model and
twelve in the retaliation model, increasing the model complexity beyond reasonable limits.
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by the agents, we abstract from this issue and rely on the results of the earlier
studies mentioned, simply assuming agents are at least to a small extend driven
by a conformist bias.
With the given average payoﬀs and switching probabilities we can now pro-
ceed to calculate the expected period-to-period change in type frequencies for
any given type distribution.19 Doing so, we obtain the following diﬀerence equa-
tions describing the expected fraction change:
∆i = pii(1− pii)
(
(1− α)β(Bi −Σj 6=i pijBj1−pii )+ α[pii −Σj 6=i pi2j1−pii ]), (3)
for all i, j ∈ {P,C,D}. Note that equation (3) holds for any number of strategies:
for two strategies, it boils down to the replicator dynamics used by Henrich and
Boyd (2001), while we will make use of the three- and six-strategy versions for
our baseline and retaliation models, respectively. Furthermore, in contrast to
the standard replicator dynamics as introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978),
for the evolutionary-stability analysis it is generally not irrelevant whether we
think of a mix of invading types or the corresponding mixed-strategy invader.
For our replicator dynamics this only holds for pii suﬃciently close to one: in
that case we can set pii − Σj 6=i pi
2
j
1−pii ≡ 1. To ensure evolutionary stability of a
pure strategy, it is then suﬃcient to require that α > −(1−α)β(Bi−Σj 6=i pijBj1−pii )
even for pi′−i = arg maxpi−i
(− Bi + Σj 6=i pij1−piiBj) subject to Σj 6=ipij = ε ≈ 0,
which is equivalent to requiring the conformist bias to be strong enough to
outweigh the normalised payoﬀ disadvantage i−type players face when paired
with an optimally mixing player.
Out of the three trivial ﬁxed points in the baseline model, P = (piP =
1, piC = 0, piD = 0), C = (0, 1, 0), and D = (0, 0, 1), D is evolutionary stable
(ES, i.e. defection is an evolutionary stable strategy, or ESS) always, while P
is ES only for αs that exceed a minimum of
αˆbase =

ek
c+k(1+e) , c < (1− e)p
c−(1−e)p+ek
2c−(1−e)p+k(1+e) , otherwise.
(4)
Before we go on examining the remaining ﬁxed points in terms of evolutionary
stability, let us look at the implications of equation (4) a little closer. The two
cases distinguish two kinds of situations, one in which contribution enforcement
is possible, c < (1− e)p, and one in which it is not. Recall that, for c < (1− e)p
to hold, every single punisher only has to inﬂect a damage of (1−e)p/N .20 This
19In taking expected values, we abstract from stochastic inﬂuences, once again for reasons of
comparability and simplicity. We also stick to the discrete-time modelling for similar reasons,
and because it is closer to the experimental data.
20From this argument, we see that comparing diﬀerent group sizes N does not have an
inﬂuence on our results only if we assume punishers adjust their per-defector punishment
expenditures κ(N) = k/N . What c > (1− e)p describes, then, is the case when the number of
9
2 THE BASELINE MODEL
is a viable option in the vast majority of studies on punishment in public-good
settings, notable exceptions being Decker et al. (2003) and treatments in Egas
and Riedl (2008) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), who explicitly address
the question of a very ineﬃcient punishment technology.21
Proceeding with our stability analysis, we ﬁnd that C will be ES only for
unrealistically high αs (αˆ = c/(2c + k)  1/3). Apart from the trivial ﬁxed
points P, C, and D, there are two mixes of two strategies each (P and D, and P
and C, respectively), plus, for certain values of alpha, an additional fully mixed
ﬁxed point.22 None of them is stable, however, which follows directly from the
stability of the trivial solutions.
In summary, we replicate the main result from Henrich and Boyd (2001):23
Result 1. While pure cooperation is not evolutionary stable under realistic
values of a conformist bias, a cooperative outcome supported by punishment
may well be.
Due to the complex nature of our dynamic system which unfortunately does
not yield the readily solvable linearities of the model presented by Henrich and
Boyd, in the following we resort to a numerical analysis of our model. Figure
(1) shows the minimum fraction of punishers for the frequency of punishers not
to decrease under diﬀerent values of α for both a) low and b) high contribution
costs.24 While it is not our primary goal to provide a model tailored to give a
detailed explaination for experimental-subject behaviour, we do want to com-
pare their qualitative results with ours. For this reason, we chose our parameter
values as close as possible to those often used in experiments for better com-
parability of results: the punishment technology is linear with a k-to-p ratio of
1 : 3;25 players interact in groups of N = 4, making mistakes in one percent of
the cases.26
players is not large enough to make the expenditure κˆ s.t. c = (1− e)τκˆN aﬀordable, where
τ is the (1 : τ) punishment technology's eﬃciency parameter.
21I am grateful to Nikos Nikiforakis for pointing me to the latter two studies.
22Unfortunately, this equilibrium cannot easily be derived analytically, as the corresponding
quadratic equations have no solution in R under most parameter combinations, apart from
being too complex for any meaningful interpretation. We therefore had to resort to a numerical
analysis to obtain this result.
23Henrich and Boyd obtain the result for even smaller conformist biases, as their result rests
on an nth-order punishment argument.
24Note that these are not the basins of attraction: in the blue case for low contribution
costs (c = 2), for example, the basin of attraction of P is but an ε-environment of P .
25This technology has also been employed by evolutionary studies, such as Hauert et
al. (2007). Other studies like Carpenter (2007) or Dreber et al. (2008) provide their agents
with more powerful punishment technologies. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we
stick to the widely used 1:3 technology, as this gives us a more conservative estimate of whether
and under what conditions P can be stabilised.
26Increasing the error parameter to e = 0.1 does not change the qualitative results. The
same holds true for changing the number of players within a group. What may result is a
shift between the situation in which contributions are enforceable and when they are not, cf.
footnote 20. The eﬀects of a deterioration of monitoring possibilities that may go hand in
hand with an increase in group sizes are studied in Carpenter (2007).
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Under the given parameters for P to be evolutionary stable, the conformist
bias need not be larger than αˆbase ≈ 0.0033, for contribution costs such that
being a punisher means investing an equivalent of one sixth of the contribution
costs in a non-contributor's punishment (the left case in ﬁgures 1 and 2). On the
other hand, for contribution costs such that the ratio of per-defector punishment
costs and contribution costs is one tenth (corresponding to the right hand sides in
ﬁgures 1 and 2), the conformist bias needs to be as large as αˆbase ≈ 0.054. Even
though a fraction of conformist learning of 5.4 percent does not seem unthink-
able, these numbers illustrate an important point: the fraction of conformist
learning necessary to stabilise punishment is highly sensitive to changes in the
costs of contribution. More speciﬁcally, from equation (4) we obtain δαˆδc < 0 for
c < (1− e)p, given P has to be stabilised against invading cooperators, whereas
δαˆ
δc > 0 for c > (1− e)p, as in this case, it is the defectors who are most likely to
invade a punishing society. However, the sensitivity of αˆ to changes in c is not
symmetric: while the critical conformist bias hardly changes when enforcement
is possible, c < (1−e)p, it increases more than proportionally with contribution
costs for a wide range of parameters under c > (1− e)p.
Figure 1: Minimum fractions of punishers such that ∆P ≥ 0 for given values of α; a) for a
low c-to-p ratio (left), and b) for a high such ratio (right).
The mixture plots in ﬁgure 1 further illustrate two points: (i) a higher
conformist bias makes it easier for punishers to survive as a group (which we
already know from our derivation of αˆbase), and (ii) for high contribution costs
c, a punishing society will be invaded by defectors directly, whereas for a modest
c (i.e. a lower c -to-p ratio), it will be invaded by cooperators ﬁrst and only then
be taken over by defectors: on the low-c graph, a small step away from P on
the PC-line carries society away from the punishing ﬁxed point while defectors
are still absent, whereas a small step on PD is reverted; and vice versa for the
high-c case. As discussed above, this is reﬂected in the equation determining
the minimum-required conformist bias for P to be ES (equation (4)). Figure 2
shows the dynamics for a fraction of conformist learning of α = 0.2.
Figure 2 illustrates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between situations in which co-
operation can be enforced by punishment and those when it cannot: for lower
contribution costs c, not only the areas of positive piP changes (cf. ﬁgure 1)
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Figure 2: Dynamics for α = 0.2 for c = 2 < 0.99 · 3 = (1− e)p (left) and c = 10
3
> 0.99 · 3 =
(1− e)p (right).
but also the basin of attraction of the ﬁxed point P is substantially larger than
for higher such costs. What follows is that it is far more likely to end up in a
cooperating steady state if contribution costs are low relative to the eﬀect of
punishment, another ﬁnding that is in line with what we would expect, given
the payoﬀ diﬀerences between defectors and the other types emanating from the
ﬁrst two stages are smaller in this case.
In the next section, we will present our extension to the baseline game intro-
ducing retaliative stages. We then proceed to discuss how the dynamics change
for diﬀerent initial levels of retaliativeness and what this may tell us about the
likelihood of diﬀerent outcomes in varying environments.
3. The retaliation game
The retaliation game is like the baseline game with n additional punishment
stages. Behaviour on these stages is guided by a `gene' (in our alternative in-
terpretation, a behavioural rule) that controls players' retaliativeness. Given
the gene may have diﬀerent consequences for diﬀerent player types, paying at-
tention to it means increasing the number of player types to six - a retaliative
and an accommodating, tolerant variant of each player type introduced in the
baseline model. Let pii,r (pii,a) denote the fraction of i-type players with(out) a
disposition to hit back in case of being punished, while pii will still denote the
total fraction of that type, i.e. pii = pii,r + pii,a. Applying the same logic as
before, a retaliator may make a mistake in exerting punitive eﬀort with proba-
bility e. Evolution will proceed according to the same principles as the types in
the baseline model do.
Let us ﬁrst analyse how the additional stages aﬀect the payoﬀs of the accom-
modating types. As these types do not get caught up in battles of punishment
and counterpunishment, it is obvious that the expected payoﬀ of accommodating
defectors and cooperators, BD,a and BC,a, is equal to that of the corresponding
baseline-model types, BD and BC from equation (1), respectively. Only the
12
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payoﬀ of tolerant punishers will undergo a slight change, as they will now face
counterpunishment actions by punished retaliators:
BD,a = −(1− e)piP p = BD
BC,a = −(1− e)c+ eBD,a = BC
BP,a = BC,a − (1− e)
(
[1− (piC + piP )(1− e)]k +
+[e(piC,r + piP,r) + piD,r](1− e)p
)
= BP − (1− e)[e(piC,r + piP,r) + piD,r](1− e)p .
On the other hand, retaliative behaviour gives rise to costs that depend on
the number of additional punishment stages n. In our evolutionary-stability
analysis, we will contrast two scenarios: the baseline model (n = 0) and the
general case in which we have n = R additional punishment stages. While
the former scenario corresponds to the setup of Fehr and Gächter (2002) in the
experimental literature, the latter can be used to represent a Nikiforakis-(2008)-
like setup for n = 1, or the 6SFI treatment in Denant-Boemont et al. (2007),
for n = 4. Larger numbers of n may be thought of as corresponding to the case
of an endogenous number of retaliation stages as in Nicklisch and Wolﬀ (2009)
or Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008).27 The additional payoﬀs from n = R,
R ≥ 2, retaliation stages are given by
BˆD,r = −(1− e)2piP,ak − (1− e)2piP,r
(
ΣRr=1[1− 1E(r)](1− e)r−1k+
+ΣRs=1 1E(s)(1− e)s−1p
)
BˆC,r = eBˆD,r
BˆP,r = eBˆD,r − (1− e)2
[
e(piC,r + piP,r) + piD,r
] ·
·
(
ΣRr=1 1E(r)(1− e)r−1k +ΣRs=2[1− 1E(s)](1− e)s−1p
)
,
where
1E(x) =
 1, (x mod 2) = 0,0, otherwise.
The additional payoﬀ of a defector from retaliation, BˆD,r, is the expected cost
of punishing back a non-retaliating punisher, −(1− e)2piP,ak, plus the expected
cost of alternating counterpunishment against and being retaliated against by
a retaliating punisher, where the probability of later stages diminishes due to
the error probability e. A retaliating cooperator and a retaliating punisher face
27The largest number of endogenous punishment stages observed in the study of Nicklisch
and Wolﬀ (2009) was eight, followed by one observation with six. These eight (six) punishment
stages boil down to one punishment plus three (two) retaliation stages if we discount rounds
due to follow-up punishment actions directed at the same player as a punishment action on
the directly preceding stage. Note that in the study discussed, and unlike in Denant-Boemont
et al. (2007), this cannot be explained by subjects trying to save on costs by spreading their
punishment actions over various punishment stages.
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the same additional costs as the retaliating defector whenever they mistakenly
defect, and the punisher faces additional costs from counterpunishing those who
retaliated against his or her ﬁrst-order punishment, as well as the ensuing feud.
Together with the corresponding replicator dynamics equation (3) which we
already know from our treatment of the baseline model, we now proceed to
analyse the changes that result for our dynamic system as a whole under the
diﬀerent scenarios.
Each baseline-model ﬁxed point corresponds to two diﬀerent ﬁxed points in
the retaliation model, one for the retaliating and one for the accommodating
variant of each type. Bearing in mind the general question we set out to answer,
that of whether a cooperative outcome can be stabilised in the presence of
retaliation opportunities, we have four candidate ﬁxed points to consider:28
1. accommodating punishers. First, it is easy to see that for the accommo-
dating variant of the punisher type to be an ESS, the requirements on the
conformist bias α will be less strong than for retaliating punishment, given
BP,r ≤ BP,a + eBˆD,r and BˆD,r|piP>0 < 0. Furthermore, an analogous ar-
gument shows there will not be any retaliation by the optimally mixing
invasion candidate. But then, we are faced with the same situation as in
the baseline model. Hence, we directly obtain
αˆP,a =

ek
Bˆ+ek
, c < (1− e)p
c−(1−e)p+ek
Bˆ+c−(1−e)p+ek , otherwise,
(5)
where
Bˆ =

− 11−eBP,r|piD,r=1, 2c+ k >
> (1− e)R
(
1E(R)p+
+[1− 1E(R)]k
)
+ E
− 11−e (BD,r −BC,a)|piP,r=1, otherwise,
is the absolute value of the largest possible payoﬀ diﬀerence divided by
(1− e), there are n = R retaliation stages, and
E = [(1− e)− (1− e)2]k + [(1− e)2 − (1− e)3]p+ · · ·
· · ·+ [(1− e)R−1 − (1− e)R]([1− 1E(R)]p+ 1E(R)k)
≈ e(bR2 ck + bR−12 cp).
We see that Bˆ = −11−eBP,r|piD,r=1 for odd numbers of retaliation stages and
sensible values of the error rate e, as well as for a large range of parameter
28Obviously, both variants of the defecting type remain an ESS in the retaliation model for
any strictly positive conformist bias. The latter is needed for the type in question to be stable
against invasion by neutral drift by its also defecting counterpart.
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values for an even number of retaliation stages including those we usually
see in economic experiments.29 We therefore focus our attention on this
case. Note that the diﬀerence between equations (4) and (5) is merely in
the largest possible payoﬀ diﬀerence in the game, −(1−e)Bˆ, the reciprocal
of the payoﬀ-normalising parameter β. Comparing equations (4) and (5),
we directly see that for any number of additional retaliation stages n,
Bˆ(n) > c + k = Bˆ(0) ≡ Bˆbase will always hold, so that it will always
require a lower conformist bias for accommodating punishers to be an ESS
than for punishers in the baseline model. In other words, the introduction
of retaliation opportunities may enhance the stabilisation of punishment.
Furthermore, it is easy to show that αˆP,a(n+ 1) < αˆP,a(n) always holds,
such that a further increase in retaliation stages always leads to a higher
likelihood of a cooperative outcome if punishers abstain from retaliation.
2. retaliating punishers. We already established that a player type setting
out to invade a society consisting exclusively of punishers will not play a
retaliating strategy with positive probability, given the debilitating eﬀect
on any individual within the majority will be very weak compared to
the impact such behaviour will have on the invader's ﬁtness. Since BP,a <
BC,a holds for any distribution of types pi, an optimally mixing invader will
never include accommodating punishment in the support, either. From
there, following a similar argument as in the baseline model we can directly
derive the critical value of the conformist bias,
αˆP,r =

ek+e[p+k]ΣRr=1(1−e)r
Bˆ+ek+e[p+k]ΣRr=1(1−e)r
, c < (1− e)p
c−(1−e)p+ek+e[p+k]ΣRr=1(1−e)r
Bˆ+c−(1−e)p+ek+e[p+k]ΣRr=1(1−e)r
, otherwise.
(6)
Comparing equations (5) and (6) yields a conﬁrmation of something we
already know, namely that it is much easier to stabilise accommodating
punishment than to stabilise the retaliating variant.30 What will be the
eﬀect of introducing retaliation opportunities compared to the baseline
scenario? We already know that the payoﬀ-normalising parameter β de-
creases for n > 0, which we have seen to facilitate the stabilisation of
punishment. Nevertheless, a comparison of (4) and (6) coupled with some
straightforward algebra shows that, for any number of stages n, n > 0, we
obtain αˆbaseP < αˆP,r(n). In other words, it needs a stronger conformist
bias to ensure evolutionary stability of punishers in an environment where
retaliation is possible if the punishers make use of that possibility. At
the same time, αˆP,r(n) is not necessarily a monotonous function of n:
29Cf. footnote 27; even for R = 7 and with k : p = 1 : 3, we obtain a condition that is
roughly equivalent to c > (1/3)p+ 2ep, which is fulﬁlled for moderate error rates and a c-to-p
ratio as in most experiments.
30To see that, note that the diﬀerence between αˆP,a and αˆP,r is simply that the same
positive number is added to both the enumerator and the denominator of 5 to obtain 6.
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while for c < (1 − e)p, an even number of retaliation stages will always
lead to a higher critical value of α than the next-lower odd number, the
converse does not always hold and is highly dependent on the chosen pa-
rameters. For our parametrisation, we have αˆP,r(n+1) > αˆP,r(n),∀n < 4,
but the opposite holds for all n′ such that n′ > 3 and 1E(n′) = 1. For
c > (1 − e)p, no general statements can be made, as the result crucially
depends on the c-to-p ratio. For the parameters used in this paper, the
αˆP,r(n+ 1) > αˆP,r(n),∀n < 3, and αˆP,r(n+ 1) < αˆP,r(n), otherwise.
3. accommodating pure cooperators. In an environment without punishers,
retaliators will always have the same payoﬀ as non-retaliatiors. In the
absence of any conformist bias, accommodating pure cooperators will be
invaded by their retaliating counterpart by neutral drift. However, this
will be prevented by any strictly positive conformist bias. Furthermore, it
is easy to see that in this environment, an invading punisher of any variant
will always have a lower expected payoﬀ than a cooperator, such that, if
accommodating pure cooperators are to be invaded, this will have to be
done by any of the defector types. Analogously to the baseline model, we
directly obtain
αˆC,a =
c
Bˆ + c
. (7)
Comparing equation (7) to equation (6), we see that, for suﬃciently small
values of the error frequency e, a reasonable number of retaliation stages
R, and a wide range of parameter combinations (c, k, p) it will be easier
to stabilise retaliating punishers than accommodating pure cooperators.31
Nevertheless, the a-priori relationship between αˆC,a and αˆP,r is unclear.
Having as little as ﬁve retaliation stages, an error rate of e = 0.15 and a
c-to-p ratio of 2 : 3 is enough to make the stabilisation of accommodating
cooperators easier than that of retaliating punishers (αˆC,a = 0.167 vs.
αˆP,r = 0.170).32 For pure cooperators, we replicate a ﬁnding we already
stated for the case of accommodating punishers: the higher the number of
additional retaliation stages, the lower the requirement on the conformist
bias for pure cooperation to be ES.
4. retaliating pure cooperators. For this group, the same holds as for accom-
modating pure cooperators, except for the fact that punishers invading in
low numbers will obtain even lower payoﬀs than against the accommodat-
ing variant. Consequently, αˆC,r = αˆC,a will hold, where αˆC,a is deﬁned
by equation (7).
Before we summarise the ﬁndings from our analysis and highlight some pos-
sible eﬀects, let me shortly comment on the diﬀerence between the baseline and
the retaliation models driving many of our above results. As we pointed out, the
diﬀerence between equations (5) and (7), on the one hand, and (4), on the other,
is merely in the largest possible payoﬀ diﬀerence in the game, (1−e)Bˆ, which is
31Cf. footnote 27.
32For comparison, under the same setting, αˆP,a = 0.015.
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the reciprocal of the payoﬀ-normalising parameter β. This payoﬀ diﬀerence may
be interpreted as the reference intervall against which the types' actual payoﬀ
diﬀerences are evaluated. In a retaliative world, the largest potential payoﬀ
diﬀerence increases, as punishers may now face retaliative actions additionally
to their own contribution and punishment expenses. Because of that, the types'
normalised payoﬀ diﬀerences become relatively smaller, and therefore, the pay-
oﬀ disadvantage faced by punishers to be outweighed by a conformist bias is
relativised. In a sense, the ﬁnding that a cooperative outcome becomes more
likely in a world where retaliation is an option but all players abstain from it
bears a vague resemblance to the results from gift-exchange experiments that
principals may do best not using their stick in a punishment world (cf. Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003).
Turning to the main results in terms of our analysis of evolutionary stability,
we can state the following:
Result 2. As expected, retaliating punishers require a higher conformist bias
to be ESS than their accommodating counterpart. For pure cooperators and
defectors, the variant does not play a role in terms of the respective ﬁxed point's
evolutionary stability.
Result 3. The existence of retaliation opportunities makes the stabilisation
of the accommodating variant of both pure cooperators and punishers easier
compared to the model without such opportunities. Each additional stage lowers
the critical value of the conformist bias for the respective type to be an ESS.
Result 4. Compared to punishment in the baseline game, for retaliating pun-
ishment to be ES a higher conformist bias is needed. The relationship between
the critical value of α and the number of retaliation stages is non-monotonic
and highly dependent on the c-to-p ratio.
Result 5. In many cases, the conformist bias needed to make retaliating pun-
ishment an ESS will be lower than that to stabilise pure cooperation. However,
this need not always be the case.
Having talked about the evolutionary stability of the diﬀerent player-types
and having established the corresponding requirements on the conformist bias,
we now want to illustrate a possible scenario that may come out of our dynamic
system. For this illustrative purpose, we choose initial fractions of punishers that
may seem excessively large when compared to common type distributions in the
typical subject pool (Fischbacher et al., 2001, or Herrmann et al., 2008). Note
however, that in public-goods experiments it is typically the fraction of coop-
erative matching groups determining the development of average contributions,
rather than e.g. the contribution level of the least cooperative matching group.
Hence, our focus on groups who a priori feature a greater disposition towards
a cooperative outcome does not seem completely unwarranted per se. Whether
the chosen type-distribution is excessively high even under these premises is a
question we do not purport to answer empirically as our aim at this point merely
is to illustrate possible patterns. Figure (3) depicts the type distributions we
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obtain for a certain initial conﬁguration under α = 0.1, e = 0.01, and a) the
baseline model, b) the retaliation model with n = 1 additional stage, and c) the
retaliation model with n = 4.33
Figure 3: Evolution of types under a) the baseline model (left), b) the retaliation model with
n = 1 (middle), and c) the retaliation model with n = 4 (right), for pi0P = 0.675, pi
0
C = pi
0
D =
0.1625, pii,r/pii = 0.37, ∀i, α = 0.1 and e = 0.01.
What ﬁgure 3 provides is an example for an initial type distribution that
would lead to the prediction of a cooperative outcome in both the baseline
and the retaliation model with ﬁve retaliation stages, but to a non-cooperative-
outcome prediction when there is only one such stage.
In ﬁgure 4 we illustrate the eﬀect a small reduction in initial retaliativeness
can have. Reducing retaliativeness in the model with n = 1 by one percentage
point, we cross the border of basins of attraction and end up with a cooperative
outcome instead of the defecting outcome depicted in ﬁgure 3. Both ﬁgures
cannot but give examples of potential patterns that may emerge, and yet they
show that the pattern of dynamics observed in the experimental studies are not
inherently inconsistent with what an evolutionary model would predict. In our
next section, we elaborate on this issue in a little more detail, discussing the
theoretical results obtained against the backdrop of the experimental ﬁndings
of punishment studies like Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) and of counterpunish-
ment studies like Nikiforakis (2008). We further put our results into the context
of earlier evolutionary models of cooperation based on punishment before con-
cluding in section 5. In that section, we shortly recapitulate our results and
address the two main questions of this paper: (i) can we still explain coopera-
tion by refering to punishment mechanisms if we accept that counterpunishment
cannot be excluded, and (ii) if we can, will retaliation have to play a role in fu-
ture models of cooperation?
33The numbers of stages were chosen as to reﬂect the experimental setups of Niki-
forakis (2008) and Denant-Boemont et al. (2007). Similar type-evolution patterns can be
found for other values of n, α, and e.
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Figure 4: Evolution of types under the retaliation model with n = 1 for an initial retaliative-
ness level pii,r/pii = 0.37, ∀i (left) and b) for pii,r/pii = 0.36,∀i (right), for pi0P = 0.675, pi0C =
pi0D = 0.1625, α = 0.1 and e = 0.01.
4. Discussion
How do our results relate to the ﬁndings of experimental studies? Studies
like Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) have shown that single-directional punish-
ment is able to maintain high contribution levels and even increase them. This
closely corresponds to our result 1: punishment can stabilise cooperation in a
model without counterpunishment even for low values of a conformist bias. In
experimental studies allowing for retaliation, results depend on the experimental
setup. While in Denant-Boemont et al. (2007, dnm) and Nikiforakis (2008), the
introduction of a single additional punishment stage with a restriction to retal-
iative punishment leads to an elimination of any contribution-enhancing eﬀect
of punishment, the former show that this breakdown of cooperation is at least in
part due to the restrictive assumption of a single, retaliative stage. In ﬁgure 3,
we illustrated how these results may come about: under a range of initial type
distributions, a cooperative outcome is observed for a single punishment stage
as well as multiple retaliative stages, but not for a single counterpunishment
stage.
Still, experimental results exhibit a large variance: in an unreported exper-
iment, Kube et al. (2009) employ the same design as Nikiforakis (2008) but do
not ﬁnd a decline in average contributions; Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008,
ne) introduce an endogenous number of punishment stages and observe a coop-
eration level that is as high as in a treatment without opportunities for retalia-
tion, which contrasts with the earlier ﬁndings of dnm.34 In our view, the most
likely explanation for these discrepancies is a subject-pool diﬀerence. As has
been illustrated in ﬁgure 4, diﬀerences in players' retaliativeness may account
for a shift in the expected outcome from cooperation to defection and vice versa.
A possible reading of our results could see the elimination of the positive eﬀects
of punishment observed in the earlier counterpunishment studies stem from so-
34The reported ﬁndings by dnm and ne were obtained using a partner-matching with chang-
ing IDs; Nicklisch and Wolﬀ (2009) ﬁnd cooperation-levels similar to those of ne for a stranger-
matching.
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ciety consisting of suﬃciently retaliative individuals, while the subjects used by
the latter studies may have been more tolerant (`accommodating'). This dif-
ference in the subject pools' average responsiveness to punishment need not be
large if the initial type distribution is close enough to the corresponding border
of attraction.
With respect to the evolutionary literature, our result 1 discussed above
conﬁrms the results of earlier models without counterpunishment opportuni-
ties, such as Henrich and Boyd (2001) or Boyd et al. (2003). Incorporating
retaliation, we ﬁnd that the level of conformist learning required to make pun-
ishment an evolutionary stable strategy is higher compared to the model without
counterpunishment if players' retaliativeness is high (result 4), but lower if re-
taliators are rare (result 3). Under the latter scenario, a purely cooperative
strategy is also more likely to be stabilised than in the baseline model (results
2 and 3). A higher number of retaliation stages plays a facilitating role for the
stability of purely cooperative strategies as well as accommodating punishment,
due to the worsened threat by the consequences of a battle of punishment and
counterpunishment. Finally, we have seen that for some parameters it may be
harder to stabilise retaliative punishment than pure cooperation (result 5).
5. Conclusion
One of the explanations considered most often for the puzzle of the high de-
gree of human cooperation has been the existence of punishment opportunities
in conjunction with the presence of strong reciprocators. In fact, this seems to be
the focal explanation for cooperation in experimental work on social-dilemmas
with no repeated interaction between the same subjects under an anonymous
setting. However, recent laboratory studies like Denant-Boemont et al. (2007)
and Nikiforakis (2008) allowed for retaliative punishment, casting serious doubt
on the hypothesis' explanatory power. While the cooperation-adverse results
of Nikiforakis (2008) seem to hinge on the restriction to a single, retaliation-
only stage, it remains unclear whether in a multiple-punishment-stage setting
cooperation can be restored to its full degree. Experimental studies have led to
contradictory ﬁndings on the question of whether the high degree of coopera-
tion among humans can still be explained by the possibility to punish defecting
society members (e.g., Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2008), or whether this is
a rather unlikely explanation (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007). To our knowl-
edge, the present study is the ﬁrst to address this question theoretically, using
an evolutionary model of cooperation with multiple punishment and counter-
punishment stages. We ﬁnd that our model can account for the breakdown of
cooperation under a single retaliation stage as well as for its `restoration' under
multiple retaliation stages. Furthermore, our results suggest that the degree
of `restoration' crucially depends on the population's retaliativeness level, sug-
gesting that the contradictory laboratory ﬁndings could easily be explained by
hardly noticeable subject-pool diﬀerences.
From a theoretic perspective, our ﬁndings suggest that not to account for
retaliation may not be an overly restrictive assumption when explaining cooper-
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ation as a phenomenon: counterpunishment may change a society's probability
of attaining a cooperative outcome, it may do so for both better and worse; at the
same time, it generally does not render the punishing ﬁxed point unattainable,
unless the level of conformist learning is very low. Therefore, if a conformist bias
is a sensible descriptor of a part of social learning processes, the introduction
of counterpunishment opportunities does not change the qualitative results of
a punishment model of cooperation. In other words, if conformist learning is a
non-negligible part of reality, abstracting from retaliation in models of coopera-
tion induced by punishment may seem a sensible assumption to make  as long
as we do not want to make quantitative predictions about the probability of a
cooperative outcome.
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